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A B Atkinson, Nuffield College, Oxford 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to set EUROMOD – the EU-wide tax and benefit model - 
in the context of the development of EU social policy. It explores the relation between the 
rapidly evolving EU social inclusion process and investment in European social science 
infrastructure. In so doing, I look mainly to the future, but I would like to begin in Sections 1 
and 2 with the historical background. It is only in this way that we can place in context the 
achievements of EU social policy and understand the need for further development. I then 
describe in Section 3 the main elements of the EU Social Inclusion process and the National 
Action Plans of Member States. A key role is played by the social indicators agreed at Laeken 
in 2001, which are the subject of Section 4. Looking to the future, the monitoring of 
performance by means of social indicators may lead to the setting of targets (Section 5). All 
of this relates to process and analysis, but substantive progress requires policy innovation and 
policy learning. In Section 6, I begin with the assessment of policy at the national level, 
arguing that there is a role for EUROMOD in analysing the policies of individual Member 
States on a consistent basis across the EU. The role is clearly crucial at the EU level (Section 
7). The potential for policy assessment is demonstrated in Section 8 in the context of a “new 
intergenerational pact”, and in terms of working back from possible targets in Section 9. The 
main lessons for policy analysis are summarised in Section 10. 
 
1. Investment in Social Science 
The pilot EUROMOD project began in 1996, but this had its origins in an earlier 
Human Capital and Mobility project on comparative social policy and taxation. This first 
project, which ran from 1993 to 1996, brought together teams from Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, and the UK. These teams in turn formed the nucleus of the EUROMOD project. The 
experience of working together demonstrated the potential of microeconomic data for the 
comparative analysis of public policy. From this was born the idea of a tax benefit simulation 
model covering the European Union. The design was ambitious from the outset. Complete 
coverage of all Member States was seen as crucial. To the original teams were added 
therefore researchers from the other ten countries that then constituted EU15.  
The research team, co-ordinated by Holly Sutherland, constructed the EUROMOD 
model (Immervoll et al, 2000). EUROMOD makes use of micro-data on individual 
households for each of the Member States. The data have been brought together in a 
consistent format at the European level and used to make calculations of the impact on 
household incomes of changes in policy parameters, such as income tax, social security 
contributions, indirect taxes, social security benefits, housing benefits, and other policy 
variables.  The underlying behavioural assumptions are highly simplified, assuming no 
change in labour market or savings behaviour. But even without these behavioural responses 
the calculations are of considerable complexity, since the different variables interact. Using 
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 this model it is possible to examine the likely first-round impact of policies already 
announced, and of the measures that may be necessary to achieve the desired poverty 
reduction.  
The construction of the EUROMOD model depended on the availability of micro data 
(that is anonymised information on individual households) for all Member States. A very 
important ingredient in its construction was therefore the European Community Household 
Panel. The ECHP was a panel survey based on a standardized questionnaire that involves 
interviewing a representative sample of households in each country, covering a wide range of 
topics, including income, health, education, housing and employment.
2 The first wave was 
conducted in 1994 in the then 12 EU Member States. This was a remarkably far-sighted 
investment.  It has played a very important role in the development of social policy analysis in 
the European Union. 
 
2. The Development of European Social Policy 
  The scientific projects described above began in the first half of the 1990s, at a time 
when European social policy was making only slow progress. To many it appeared that the 
EU was pre-occupied with economics. It was a common market plus a currency union. 
Market liberalization was the key, coupled with the euro. Critics argued that the social 
dimension should be developed in parallel, but little was achieved in concrete terms. 
  All was to change with the Lisbon Summit of March 2000, where Heads of State and 
Government decided that the Union should adopt the strategic goal for the next decade of 
becoming `the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy ... with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion'. Social cohesion appeared in the same sentence as 
“competitive economy”.  The incorporation of the promotion of social inclusion within the 
overall strategy of the EU was taken up by successive Presidencies: Portugal, France, Sweden 
and Belgium. At the Nice Summit in December 2000, it was agreed to advance social policy on 
the basis of an open method of coordination, modelled on that already adopted for employment 
in the “Luxembourg process”.  The process of open co-ordination involves fixing guidelines for 
the Union, establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators to be applied in each Member 
State, and periodic monitoring in a process of peer review. 
  As a result we now (in 2004) have a Social Inclusion process alongside the European 
Employment Strategy and the goal of speeding European economic growth.  I am particularly 
concerned here with the Social Inclusion process, but this should form part of an integrated 
approach to social and economic policy. All too often, at both national and EU levels, economic 
and social policies are formed separately. In the past, the pursuit of parallel processes meant 
that potential conflicts were not addressed; nor were potential synergies exploited. Yet it is 
clear that the choice of policies to achieve economic growth and competitiveness has 
implications for the goals of social inclusion. And vice versa. Effective social protection can 
make a considerable contribution to economic performance. 
 
3. The EU Social Inclusion Process and National Action Plans 
  The tools being used to implement the Social Inclusion process are well known, and are 
set out schematically in Figure 1. For the Member States, their main participation is via the 
National Action Plans (NAP)/inclusion. These now form part of the acquis communautaire, and 
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  2the new Member States submitted Plans in 2004. The Commission co-ordinates the production 
of the Joint Inclusion Report (European Commission, 2002 and 2003). The first NAPs were 
heterogeneous, with some countries putting in much more effort than others, but on the whole 
they were substantial documents, and the total came to some 1,200 pages. They were 
subjected to peer review, and the EU produced an agreed Joint Report on Social Inclusion. 
This 226-page report was a joint report of the Council and Commission. As noted in the 
Executive Summary, “it is the first time that the European Union endorses a policy document 
on poverty and social exclusion (European Commission, 2002, page 9).  
  The second round of NAPs was submitted in July 2003. They are again substantial 
documents. The Italian NAP is 66 pages long, but the statistical annex is a further 83 pages; 
the NAP for Denmark is 60 pages long; for Greece 48 pages; for Finland 68 pages; for 
Portugal 116 pages. Germany, whose first plan was a rather slender document, has a NAP 
2003-2005 that extends to 109 pages. The NAP follow a format laid down by the Social 
Protection Committee. Each of them contains an analysis of the national situation. All 
countries describe the recent evolution of poverty and social exclusion in qualitative terms, 
and in some cases this is supplemented by quantitative series covering a number of years. The 
German NAP notes that the poverty rate fell slightly – although the fall from 11.2% in 1998 
to 10.9% in 2001 was almost certainly within the confidence interval surrounding the 
estimates. It also noted that the poverty rate in the new Länder rose from 13.6% to 15.9%. 
The Dutch NAP noted that, whereas the proportion of people with a minimum income fell 
from 8.5% in 1995 to 7.7% in 2000, the proportion below 60% median exhibited no clear 
trend. In the case of Finland, the percentage below the 60% median line was 3 percentage 
points higher in 2001 than ten years earlier.  The NAP reports that the poverty risk had 
increased since 1995 among the long-term unemployed, single parents, those renting housing, 
and young adults.  
  The 2003 Joint Report noted, “with enlargement, the Union will have to face new and 
comparatively greater challenges in promoting social inclusion”. It was therefore “crucial to 
involve all Acceding Countries in the EU social inclusion process, well before the date of 
formal enlargement”. Before accession, the Commission engaged in a bilateral co-operation 
process, which led to each new Member State drafting a Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM), 
with the aim of identifying the key social issues and the major policies in place or planned. In 
July 2004, the ten new Member States submitted their first National Action Plans. They are, 
like those for the existing member States, substantial documents. The NAP for Estonia, for 
example, at 57 pages (in English) is one of the shorter; the NAP for Hungary consists of 63 
pages plus an appendix of 31 pages. The NAP for Cyprus contains a Statistical Appendix 
making extensive comparisons with other new member States and with the EU15. 
 
4. Social Indicators 
A key element in linking these different parts is the set of social indicators agreed by 
Heads of State and Government at the Laeken European Council in December 2001. These 
indicators were the result of work by the Sub-Group on Social Indicators established by the 
Social Protection Committee (European Commission, 2001; see also Atkinson et al, 2002). The 
indicators encompass financial poverty, income inequality, regional variation in employment 
rates, long-term unemployment, joblessness, low educational qualifications, low life expectancy 
and poor health.  In each case there are breakdowns, showing for example poverty among men 
and women, or breakdowns by age groups. The social indicators are used to measure progress 
  3towards achieving the objectives of the Social Inclusion process. They show for instance how far 
the overall poverty rate in the EU has been reduced. 
The Joint Reports contain values of these indicators in the Statistical Annexes. The data 
are drawn from the Labour Force Survey for the employment-related indicators and the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), referred to above, for the income-related 
indicators, health and other indicators. The ECHP is to be replaced by the EU Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which will become the EU reference source for 
income and social exclusion statistics.  
One general feature of these indicators is that they are concerned with outcomes, and not 
with the methods by which the outcome is achieved. We are not looking here at indicators of, for 
example, replacement rates. This reflects the fact that policies to achieve social inclusion are the 
responsibility of Member States, under the subsidiarity principle.  The objectives of policy have 
been agreed, but Member States are free to choose the methods by which these objectives are 
realised. One country may achieve low poverty rates by active labour market policy; another 
may place more reliance on social transfers. Spending alone is not a guide to policy effort. In one 
country transfers may be provided by the state; in another transfers may be private. In one 
country, training may be associated with apprenticeships; in another it may be part of the school 
system. The aim is to measure social outcomes, not the means by which they are achieved.  
 
5. From Indicators to Targets 
Many have argued that the objective of greater social cohesion can be made concrete 
only by setting targets for the reduction of poverty and social exclusion similar to those that 
have evolved in the macroeconomic and employment fields as part of the Maastricht process 
and the Employment Strategy. While the adoption of an initial common set of social inclusion 
indicators represents a major achievement, if the process is to be meaningful and credible, 
targets are essential. The need to do so has already been recognized at the highest political 
level, with the Barcelona European Council in spring 2002 stating, “The European Council 
stresses the importance of the fight against poverty and social exclusion. Member States are 
invited to set targets, in their National Action Plans, for significantly reducing the number of 
people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2010.”  The Common Outline for the 
2003/2005 NAPs/inclusion explained that such targets are important for several reasons. 
National targets are ‘a significant political statement of purpose’; they provide ‘a goal against 
which to measure progress’ (European Commission, 2003, Appendix I). The targets should 
also promote awareness of social inclusion policies and provide a focus for policy-makers.  
The setting of targets would be a major departure. Only a minority of countries had 
outcome targets in their first NAPs, and these were not all systematically linked to one or 
several indicators to be used for monitoring progress towards achieving them. Ireland’s plan 
did present such a target, already at the core of its National Anti-Poverty Strategy, in terms of 
a measure of ‘consistent poverty’ relating to both falling below a relative income threshold 
and experiencing deprivation in terms of a small set of non-monetary indicators. Sweden set 
out a target for reducing welfare dependency (as well as increasing employment). The UK has 
adopted a number of specific targets relating to the activities of different government 
departments, as well as a commitment to eradicate child poverty. Similarly, the Netherlands 
has set targets for reducing early school leaving, illiteracy and ‘unhealthy life years’.  
  If countries initially focus their target setting on social outcomes that are seen as 
particularly important to their own situation, then different countries may have different 
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of agreeing common indicators in the first place is that Member States should be working 
towards a situation where targets are framed in terms of those commonly agreed indicators, or 
are at least systematically linked to some of these. This would facilitate mutual learning and 
exchange of good practices between Member States, which is a key rationale of the open 
method of co-ordination.  
 
6. Assessment of Policy at the National Level 
Even if targets have yet to be accepted, the progress in procedural terms has been 
impressive, but progress in substantive terms leaves much to be desired. As it was put in the 
2003 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, “the fight against poverty and 
social exclusion remains a major challenge for the European Union and its Member States. 
The numbers affected by poverty and social exclusion across the Union are very significant” 
(European Commission, 2003a, page 4).  There must be very considerable doubt as to the 
extent of improvement in social conditions that can be achieved by 2010, particularly in the 
light of the economic conjuncture. 
  How can substantive progress be made? To understand this further, we need to build a 
stronger link between the policies described in the NAPs of individual Member States and 
their contribution to progress as measured by the social indicators. At present there tends to be 
a disjuncture, where one part of the Plan deals with policies and a second part, often in an 
appendix, presents the social indicators. The indicators are not really embedded in the policy 
process. More specifically, we need to ask: will announced policies lead to significant 
improvement in social indicators?  The UK for example has developed an extensive system of 
credits, for families, for workers and for pensioners. What will be the impact of this change in 
policy on indicators such as risk of poverty rate/ the number of working poor/ the proportion 
living in jobless households? Reading the NAPs, one is struck with the large number of 
policies that are directed at very specific groups, such as lone parent families. Such measures 
are obviously very significant for the group concerned, and in terms of domestic policy. But is 
the cumulation of the effects of such measures large enough to have a significant impact? 
 In order to answer this question, one needs to model the implications of the policy for 
individual households. The capacity to model policy impact exists within Member States; 
countries have microsimulation models, albeit of varying degrees of development. It would be 
possible in this context for the Commission to evaluate the NAP by relying on national 
models. This is in effect the approach adopted by the OECD, where studies such as those of 
replacement rates are based on the responses of Member State governments. There are 
however several reasons why a EU-wide model, such as EUROMOD, may be necessary.  
The first reason for a EU-wide model is that the open method of coordination is based 
on peer review and mutual learning. For this purpose a common basis for evaluation seems 
essential. While the Commission could attempt to specify in great detail the way in which 
policy should be modelled, if this stops short of full model specification then there will 
always be the possibility that differences across Member States reflect differences in 
modelling and not in reality. The experience with the construction of EUROMOD has 
underlined the enormous scope for variation in assumptions and data handling. We have to 
recognise that any microsimulation model is a representation, and that there could be a 
number of different representations corresponding to any set of data. Predictions of the effect 
of policy changes are conditional on the representation adopted. In some cases these are 
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assumptions are implicit and their significance is unclear. For this reason, it seems desirable 
that peer review should be based on results from the same playing field, a playing field that is 
not necessarily level but where the results for each Member State are affected by the same 
bumps. (The location of the bumps may, of course, affect some Member States more than 
others.) 
  The second reason is that it is important that the model be accessible. The fourth 
Objective of the Social Inclusion process is “the mobilisation of all relevant actors”. The 
availability of tax benefit models to the general public is in itself a means to assist wider 
participation in the policy formation process. A EU-wide model at the disposal of the 
Commission is a vehicle that would allow them to further this key objective.  
The third reason is that a EU-wide model facilitates policy learning. The EU Social 
Inclusion process has led a number of Member States to look critically at their own policies in 
those dimensions where they are performing below the EU average. A good example is 
provided by the study by Callan et al (2004) of “Why is relative income poverty so high in 
Ireland?” In this study, they consider the implications of introducing a welfare system closer 
to that of Denmark, a country which has a low relative poverty rate. In the same way, the 
study by Levy (2001) of Spain compares the child-targeted reforms in that country with the 
policies of Denmark, France, Germany and the UK. 
The final reason is that a EU-wide model is a natural step towards considering the 
impact on the EU as a whole.  We need to be able to add up across Member States. 
 
7. Analysis at the EU Level 
At the EU level, EUROMOD can contribute to the analysis of “what works” in terms 
of policy intervention. First, we need to know what will be the impact on EU-wide risk of 
poverty/ number of working poor/ jobless households of changes in policy by individual 
Member States? 
 
 Policies   Indicators   
 
The key features of EUROMOD are summarised in Figure 2. EUROMOD simulates a 
wide variety of policy instruments, including (a) income taxes, local and national, (b) social 
insurance contributions paid by employees, employers and the self-employed, (c) family 
benefits, (d) housing benefits, and (e) social assistance and other income-related benefits. 
There are of course other taxes and benefits that are not modelled, including capital and 
property taxes, and real estate taxes. In some cases, due to the limitations of the input data, it 
has not yet been possible to model fully pension and survivor benefits, other contributory 
benefits, and disability benefits. This means that there are certain classes of policy action that 
cannot be simulated. Further reasons why we cannot model policy initiatives are that there are 
attached conditions that cannot be verified in EUROMOD or that the policy is restricted to 
groups of the population that cannot be identified in EUROMOD. The Greek NAPincl 
illustrates both problems.  This includes measures to subsidise the employment of socially 
vulnerable groups, such as ex-drug addicts, ex-prisoners, juvenile delinquents, not identified 
in EUROMOD, and includes a child tax credit conditional on school attendance, not recorded 
in the data available for the construction of EUROMOD. 
  6  But this still leaves a wide range of policy instruments that can be simulated using 
EUROMOD, as is illustrated in Figure 3 for policies directed at helping families with 
children.  Suppose that the EU were to decide to give priority to children living at risk of 
poverty. Additional financial help can be provided in a variety of ways, and different Member 
States will make different choices. Tax allowances for children can be increased, or 
introduced; they can be accompanied by tax credits for those not subject to income tax. Child 
benefit, a universal cash benefit, is the most direct form of cash transfer. Child credits, income 
tested, may appear a more targeted mechanism, although such credits in practice suffer from 
incomplete take-up.  Targeting may also be achieved by concentrating increased benefits on 
families already in receipt of social insurance or social assistance, although this may reduce 
the incentive to return to work. EUROMOD brings together these changes in policy 
parameters with the household characteristics. At the most basic level, this allows estimates to 
be made of the cost of different proposals. The net effect on the government budget depends 
on the interaction between different elements: for example, an increase in child benefit may 
be partly offset by reduced social assistance payments. An integrated tax benefit model is 
necessary to take account of these feedback effects.  
  In the case of the social indicators, EUROMOD can be used to calculate the 
implications for household disposable incomes.  This allows direct calculation of three of the 
primary indicators agreed at Laeken: (1) proportion below 60% median, (2) ratio of top 
quintile share to bottom quintile share, and (4) median poverty gap. It does not allow 
calculation of poverty persistence (indicator 3), since the model does not contain data on 
previous income. In order to predict changes in labour market indicators (indicators 5-7) 
EUROMOD must be linked to a model of labour market behavioural change. This has been 
done, for example, by Bargain and Orsini (2004), who examine the effect of introducing in-
work benefits on labour supply and poverty. Immervoll et al (2004) use labour supply 
elasticities, together with tax and benefit calculations from EUROMOD, to compare across 14 
countries the effects on equity and efficiency of different types of welfare reform. Without a 
behavioural model, EUROMOD on its own allows the calculation of marginal tax rates and 
replacement rates, so that it generates information that is very useful in considering the 
implications for work incentives.   
 
8. A New Intergenerational Pact 
  The recent report of the High-Level Group on the future of social policy in an 
enlarged European Union has called for “a new intergenerational pact”, looking at a balance 
across the life cycle. At present, policy tends to concentrate on isolated stages of the life 
cycle: the “pension problem” or “child poverty”. We need however to recognise that everyone 
is likely to pass through different life cycle stages, and that families consist of several 
different generations. In policy terms, it may be easier to resolve the inevitable 
intergenerational conflicts if we look at the problem as a whole. Older workers may, for 
example, be more willing to accept a scaling back of their retirement pension entitlements if 
they see the resources being invested in the young. The pension problem is seen in purely 
negative terms, whereas investment in children conveys a more hopeful message. 
  In order to analyse the impact of such intergenerational policy, we ideally need a 
model that treats change over time. EUROMOD is static and cannot model the trade-offs over 
time. It does however have the merit of covering the population as a whole and of treating 
households as a unit. It is not concentrated on the circumstances of pensioners or of the 
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household in which they are living. It is therefore possible to examine the impact on social 
performance of a scaling back of replacements rates in retirement, and to compare the 
consequences of different uses for the savings. Reduced pensions may be seen as an 
opportunity to reduce the social security contributions of the working population. The 
distributional impact may be compared with that of using the savings to raise child benefits, 
as would be indicated by the intergenerational pact.  
 
9. Working Back from the Targets 
In sections 7 and 8, we looked at the relationship leading from policies to outcomes as 
measured by the social indicators. We now reverse the process and ask what changes in policy 
are necessary to achieve a specified reduction in different social indicators?   
 
Policies   Indicators 
 
As noted earlier, the Commission has in the past recommended the setting of targets. Two 
years ago, in its Communication to the Spring European Council in Barcelona, the European 
Commission proposed that the European Council should set the target of halving the poverty 
rate from 18% to 9% by 2010 (2002, page 16). Suppose that the Commission had been asked 
– what measures need to be taken to achieve a halving of the poverty rate?   
Here again EUROMOD is useful in that it allows us to work back from the target to 
the changes necessary. It allows us to see whether indeed the target is feasible. Suppose for 
example that the EU wished to halve the number of children in the EU living at risk of 
poverty? To this end, Member States are required to provide a minimum income for children. 
This could be done under subsidiarity, with each state free to choose the method. 
Implementation would be left to Member States, who could employ different instruments (child 
benefit, tax credits, benefits in kind, employer-mandated benefits). The amount of the minimum 
would take account of the circumstances of each Member State, particularly the lower per capita 
incomes of the new Member States. It could be defined as a percentage of the Member State 
median equivalised income for each child (and possibly age-related). Such a policy would have 
obvious attractions in that investment in children would have a pay-off too in terms of the future 
labour force.  
  Using EUROMOD, it would be possible to monitor the extent to which the Member 
State policies would achieve the desired reduction in risk of poverty. We can calculate the 
impact of different levels of the minimum on the poverty rate among children. Sutherland 
(2001) has shown how EUROMOD can be used to explore the relationship between child 
poverty and the scale of cash benefits and tax allowances in four EU Member States. 
Extending this to the whole EU, it would be possible to plot the EU-wide poverty rate as a 
function of the level of the child minimum, as shown schematically in Figure 4. The graph 
should be distinguished from the – commonly used – diagram linking poverty rates to the 
overall level of social protection spending expressed as a percentage of GDP. While the latter 
diagrams are interesting, they do not give any indication of the policy linkage. One cannot 
deduce that a 1% rise in social protection spending will lead to a x% fall in poverty. In 
contrast, Figure 4 is policy-relevant. It would give a first-round measure of the policy change 
necessary to achieve a specified reduction in the risk of child poverty. 
  8  Behind the aggregate picture lies the detail of tax and benefits systems. The fine 
structure of policy can be very important in determining its impact. EUROMOD allows users 
to experiment with changes in the institutional details of transfers and taxes, seeking the most 
effective combination to achieve the targets in particular country settings. Of particular 
interest is the “swapping” of benefit and tax systems, so that we can see the impact in country 
A of applying the system of country B, as is illustrated in the case of the UK and Netherlands 
by Immervoll et al (2001). Again this can be extended to the EU as a whole, using the 




The aim of this paper has been to demonstrate how the investment in social science 
research infrastructure, and in EUROMOD in particular, can be employed to aid the EU 
Social Inclusion process. This is especially important given the need to translate policy 
initiatives into effective progress in reducing social exclusion. What EUROMOD offers is a 
first-round analysis of the impact of policy changes on the indicators of risk of poverty and 
income inequality. It provides such essential elements of the policy debate as estimates of the 
net cost of different proposals. It is a unique tool in that it provides results for individual 
Member States within a consistent framework and provides results for the EU as a whole. 
The investment is already paying off in providing the basis for EU social policy 
development. Looking to the future, further investment is clearly necessary. EUROMOD was 
ambitious in seeking to cover the EU as a whole, and if this ambition is to be maintained, then 
the model has to be extended to EU25 and beyond. The new Member States are fully 
participating in the Social Inclusion process, and it is to be hoped that resources can be found 
to maintain momentum.  
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